RESIDENZENFORSCHUNG

SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF URBAN SPACES THROUGH THE AGES
SOZIALE FUNKTIONEN STÄDTISCHER RÄUME IM WANDEL

Edited by Gerhard Fouquet, Ferdinand Opll,
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THORBECKE

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Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen

# RESIDENZENFORSCHUNG
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Cities as Sites of Social Protest

Europe from the Late Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century

FRIEDRICH LENGER

Cities have a long tradition as sites of social protest. The narration of its history is mostly agreed on one point, i.e. the increasingly less violent and more orderly character of protest[1]. On a very general level this fits the framework suggested by Norbert Elias who described a process towards more and more civil forms of behaviour many decades ago[2]. While his explanations for this process have been severely criticised time and again, the statement as such has been accepted widely. And his assumption of unilinear development has been adopted by theories whose temporal reach, in contrast to Elias, does not include the middle ages but focuses more clearly on the time span from the eighteenth to the twentieth century[3]. Viewed from this perspective, approaches seemingly as far apart as modernisation theory and Foucauldian governmentality studies not only converge in the resulting image of an ever more peaceful urban sphere but appear as virtual mirror images of each other: For the former, on the one hand, protest is becoming more and more organised and institutionalised. This implies a learning process on the side of the protesters and marginalises earlier more violent and spontaneous forms. For the adherents of Foucauldian governmentality theory, on the other hand, the transition from a disciplinary regime to one of security is the key explanation and the increasingly effective self-disciplining of subjects typical for the latter's liberal governmentality. Both approaches describe long-term processes that, however, fit poorly to the far more contradictory images emerging from detailed historical studies. Since the mentioned theories largely refer to European developments, it seems appropriate to contrast them with some findings on European cities in the long nineteenth century[4]. Without accepting the widespread understanding of certain protest forms as occurring in consecutive order, it seems advisable to deal with food

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1   Cf. the excellent surveys by SCHEUTZ, Stadt (2016), and EIBACH, Violence (2016).
2   Cf. ELIAS, Prozess (1978), a book written in the interwar period.
3   For a brief discussion of the problematic statistical basis of long-term diagnoses cf. KNÖBL, Überlegungen (2013).
4   In doing so the article draws heavily on LENGER, European Cities (2012), and IDEM, Metropolen (2013).

or subsistence riots, urban revolutions and mass demonstrations as well as strikes in three separate sections before briefly concluding with a look at some violent confrontations which fundamentally question many of the assumptions underlying modernisation theories predicting a trend towards less violence and more civility.

The decline of food riots: postulated rather than observed

When looking at forms of social protest in early modern cities, the food riot clearly occupies centre stage. And a line of continuity seems to link the numerous food riots of the eighteenth century to their predecessors in earlier epochs. In the still prevailing reading, as for example represented by Charles Tilly, this is also a line characterised by decline because for him, as for quite a few other historians and social scientists, violent collective protests against the scarcity of food, or more precisely against extreme increases of the prices of bread and other foodstuffs, are basically a premodern phenomenon. It is not, however, a form of protest that has remained unchanged for centuries: Referring to the famine of 1768 in Le Havre, Rouen or Mantes, Tilly writes:

> »When violence breaks out this year, it most often assumes the shape of a food riot. In the food riot's most developed form, mixed crowds of ordinary people gather angrily before the shop of a miller, a merchant, a baker. They complain about prices, seize the food on hand, cart it off to the market square, sell it to all comers (so long as they belong to the community) at a price they declare to be just, turn the cash over to the owner of the grain or bread, and go home saying they have done justice, as the authorities themselves should have done justice.«

And he continues: »A century earlier the crowd would normally have smashed, man-handled, and looted«[5]. So while basically being a premodern phenomenon, for Tilly the food riot itself displays the features of a long-term process of decreasing violence. The central point in our context is that this form of popular protest has run its course by the mid-nineteenth century: »After that, the tax rebellion, the food riot, machine-breaking, and similar events virtually disappeared«[6]. Although being critical of the (modernisation) theory that supports this interpretation, E. P. Thompson's influential analysis of a »moral economy« at work here has indirectly supported this relegation of food or subsistence riots to a pre-modern past because it leads to the assumption that reference to just prices or honourable behaviour on the side of bakers and traders will disappear once a modern capitalist market economy is firmly entrenched[7].

And, maybe even more remarkable still, the food riot is also at the centre of Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality. After all, it is the concomitant of a mercantilist system which aims at doing away with food shortages by prohibitions and regulations.

5   TILLY, TILLY, TILLY, Rebellious Century (1975), p. 17.
6   Ibid., p. 61.
7   Cf. THOMPSON, Moral economy and the English Crowd (1991).

And the abolition of this system, as demanded, for example, by the French physiocrats, is precisely the point of departure for Foucault`s concept of a liberal governmentality characterised by the conviction that a self-regulating system of market forces is the most promising means of avoiding famines and – by implication – food riots, too[8]. So under this new regime the market, like the family and civil society, is placed »outside the legitimate scope of political authorities«, although this strategy of non-interference goes hand in hand with attempts of »shaping the conduct of free individuals in the direction of civility« by ordering markets or designing urban spaces[9]. Unsurprisingly Foucault introduces Adam Smith as crown witness for this new liberal governmentality[10]. And while this is quite fitting in general, it needs to be said that Smith himself – although an ardent supporter of a deregulated grain trade in France as well as in Britain – was under no illusion that in the case of a famine granaries would be pillaged[11].

Now, since the mid-1970s when Charles, Louise and Richard Tilly published their influential work on collective violence in Europe between 1830 and 1930, it has become clear that food riots did not peter out after the revolutions of 1848. A recent survey of the early twentieth century by Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, for example, found countless examples from cities all over Europe[12]. And they show the well-known characteristics of earlier food riots. Thus, they are first of all consumer protests, and in as far as the responsibility for the material wellbeing of the family and especially for children was seen as a maternal obligation, women are the main actors. Secondly, these protests display the features of a moral economy as described by Thompson and others. Although looting occasionally occurs, typically the food on offer on an urban market and considered too expensive is not simply stolen but sold by protesters at prices deemed just. Similarly, the participants of the 1873 beer riots at Mannheim did not want their beer for free but for the old price that was no longer considered sufficient by the brewers of the city[13]. Accordingly, the motive is not simply hunger or thirst but a conception of the adequate provision with specific foodstuffs. Therefore, black bread is not an acceptable surrogate for white bread, nor can beer be replaced by brandy because both white bread and beer are regarded as superior and as the expression of a standard of life to be defended at all costs[14]. And violence, which is often part of the protests, is not a spontaneous outburst either but part of what Eric Hobsbawm has called »bargaining by riot«[15]. – Now, such a summary description is not meant to convey a romanticising picture of this particular form of protest. The people or the consumers are by no means always a homogeneous group agreed on one unques-

8   Cf. FOUCAULT, Geschichte, pt. 1 (2004), esp. lecture 2; unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own.
9   ROSE, Critical Sociology (1995), pp. 215 and 217; cf. JOYCE, Rule (2003).
10   Cf. RONGE, Adam-Smith-Projekt (2015).
11   Cf. LENGER, Adam Smiths Wohlstand (2018), while the debate between THOMPSON, Moral Economy Reviewed (1991), and HONT, Jealousy (2005), over Smith may be left aside here.
12   Cf. HAUPT, Gewalt (2013).
13   Cf. MACHTAN, OTT, »Batzebier« (1984).
14   Cf. LENGER, Metropolen (2013), pp. 291–293, and MACHTAN, Ott, »Batzebier« (1984), p. 135.
15   HOBSBAWM, Machine Breakers (1967), p. 9.

tioned conception of justice but can be characterised by vicious cleavages. Thus, during the subsistence riots of World War I, especially severe in Vienna, female consumers were sharply divided in war widows, defamed as unjustly privileged, and others. And the persecution of the profiteers of black marketing quite often took on antisemitic overtones[16].

Be that as it may. The examples should suffice to demonstrate that on the one hand food riots, which continued to be staged at market places, shops and occasionally pubs, by no means simply disappeared after 1848, and on the other hand they bore witness to specific times as, for example, the state support for widows referred to testifies. While it may not be an all too exciting result that the Tillys had it wrong, it may be worthwhile to look more closely at the reasons they introduced for the alleged disappearance of violent food riots. There were basically three: market integration, state formation and party politics. Now, the first two of these are plausible enough but obviously not sufficient to do away with food riots after the mid-nineteenth century. While the much increased market integration made it easier to provide grain from distant places in times of crisis, there were marked exceptions to this rule in war times, as the Viennese example demonstrates, where the traditional Hungarian supply shrank extremely in World War I[17]. As far as state formation and an increased policing are concerned, the argument again is plausible in general but overestimates the degree to which the police could control an unruly urban population in the late nineteenth century. In the towns of the Ruhr, for example, where due to the mono-industrial structure of the area strikes easily turned into urban revolts, the military was called for regularly – hardly a pacifying move[18]. And in Berlin, as the work of Thomas Lindenberger has amply demonstrated, the militaristic outlook of the police played a part in the escalation of conflicts that appeared to be minor ones at first[19]. But the most important and most clearly mistaken factor in the explanation of the Tilly's is the one abbreviated by the term party politics. The assumption here is that urban protest became less violent over time because urbanites had more and more alternative ways to express their wishes and to reach their goals. Associations of all sorts including trade unions and political parties are supposed to have organised and disciplined a formerly unruly urban population. Thus, a closer look at more overtly political protests is needed.

Revolutions, assemblies, demonstrations

While decades of research have clearly shown that food riots were anything but unpredictable eruptions of collective anger, they can still be distinguished from more explicitly political forms of protest. Although the term ›revolution‹ has been applied to the urban sites of the German Peasants' War of the early sixteenth century as well, there is much less

16   Cf. LENGER, Metropolen (2013), pp. 289–299; HEALY, Vienna (2004); WEIGL, Hungerproteste (2016).
17   Cf. WEIGL, Hungerproteste (2016).
18   Cf. JESSEN, Polizei (1991).
19   Cf. LINDENBERGER, Straßenpolitik (1995).

continuity here. The controversy rather runs over the question how to group various re-
volutions. The Paris Commune of 1871 clearly plays a key role here. For Marx and his
followers it was the first proletarian revolution with all the promises this implied[20]. For
others, however, the Commune was rather the last in a row because it so closely resembled
its predecessors of 1789, 1830 and 1848. And there are at least three good reasons to take
this second stand: First of all, class affiliation or a shared proletarian work experience hardly
played a role in the events of 1871. The Communards were rather organised on the basis of
their neighbourhoods which were not yet clearly segregated by class. Secondly, there is
quite a bit of continuity in the guiding visions from the late eighteenth-century demands of
the Sansculottes that nobody should be allowed to own more than one workshop or more
than one shop to the artisanal socialism of producers' cooperatives so important in 1848
and 1871[21]. And finally, the thinking of the urban revolutionaries did not really transcend
the urban sphere. The way in which the Communards confronted the national government
with their demands was at best naive and had deadly consequences for many of them[22].

   While urban revolutions by definition surpass city limits, they are at the same time
firmly located within urban space. And as the look at revolutionary Paris from 1789 to
1871 plainly demonstrates, streets and neighbourhoods are central here. After all, the re-
building of Paris under Napoléon III and Haussmann aimed – among other things – at
making barricade fighting more difficult[23]. Beyond the streets and neighbourhoods, in
which protest was firmly rooted, symbolically charged central places like the Bastille at
the beginning of the first or the burnt down city hall at the end of the last of these Parisian
revolutions featured prominently. It would be misleading, however, to conclude from this
elevated role of central locations that these were also the places hosting the first attempts
at peaceful demonstrations. If we consider, for example, the impressive mass assemblies
organised by radical and later Chartist politicians in England during the first half of the
nineteenth century, it is difficult to overlook that they took place in the green surroundings
of Spa Fields, St Peter's Fields or the Kennington Common, to give but three examples.
And while it is obvious that these mass meetings bringing together tens of thousands of
people needed quite a bit of space, the distance to the respective city centres of London
or Manchester is astounding. As late as April 1848, this allowed military and police forces
to almost effortlessly control the bridges that amongst others O'Connor and his close
collaborators had to cross in order to present the Chartist mass petition to the House of
Commons[24]. After the heat of the mid-century revolutions had subsided, London only
very reluctantly embraced political demonstrations in more prominent locations. Hyde
Park and Trafalgar Square were two of these, and since the former was the property of
the crown, it was occasionally referred to by protesters as »our park«. When in 1886 the

20   Cf. Marx, Bürgerkrieg ([8]1983).
21   Cf. SOBOUL, Sans-culottes (1968), p. 70.
22   Cf. only GOULD, Insurgent Identities (1995), and TOMBS, Paris Commune (1999).
23   Cf. JORDAN, Neuerschaffung (1996), p. 208.
24   Cf. BELCHEM, ›Orator‹ Hunt (1985), esp. pp. 58–70 and 106–107, as well as THOMPSON, Chart-
ists (1984), pp. 324–325.

Social Democratic Federation moved its demonstration of unemployed workers from the Square to the Park in order to avoid the confrontation with its protectionist rivals also gathering at Trafalgar Square, the participants had to pass through streets that were home to the most prestigious shops and the most exclusive clubs. Both were attacked by protesters possibly aroused by provocations from the clubs. *The West End was for a couple of hours in the hands of the Mob*, the ›Times‹ concluded in horror, making clear that the landscape of political protest cut across the social divisions of urban space[25].

On the European continent urban space was hardly more hospitable for political demonstrations. In Berlin social democratic workers experimented with well attended marches accompanying the funeral processions of prominent party leaders before reaching some kind of tacit arrangement with the police to stage huge suffrage demonstrations in the years before World War I[26]. Such a tacit agreement was out of the question in cities like Barcelona or St. Petersburg. In 1905 petitioners approaching the Winter Palace peacefully were shot at by soldiers – an event killing and hurting numerous participants and leading to street fighting for days and ultimately contributing to the Russian revolution of 1905[27]. Even a more detailed map of the enormous differences regarding the manoeuvring space for political demonstrations in European cities before World War I would not result in a conclusive answer to the question whether an extension of democratic participation in the later nineteenth century accounted for fewer urban revolts. This has to do with the unfounded assumption that an increased inclusion into political decision making would automatically lessen the need for more spontaneous and potentially violent forms of protest. It is unfounded because it presupposes the need to express some interests as a constant while it allows variations in the ways in which these interests are expressed. In doing so it largely ignores ethic and national, religious and confessional conflicts as the cause for violent protest which are so obvious if one includes Eastern and Southern Europe into the picture.

Strikes: contexts and meanings

The general and mistaken logic at play here becomes more obvious when we turn to strikes and the labour movement more generally. The latter is conceived as a somewhat natural phenomenon produced by one common interest. Thus, Dick Geary argues »that the driving motive of Russian as well as English workers was one and the same, i. e. the wish for a warm meal«[28]. In order to achieve that goal, different strategies were needed, however, since the circumstances varied enormously from one country to the next. But although they did, a certain consecutive order can be observed with modern industrial protest usually doing without the use or threat of physical violence because the workers' position in the

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25   Cited in: DENNIS, Cities (2008), p. 165; cf. LENGER, European Cities (2012), pp. 242–243.
26   Cf. WARNEKEN, »Friedliche Gewalt«.
27   Cf. the brief summary in LENGER, Metropolen (2013), pp. 264–265.
28   GEARY, Arbeiterprotest (1983), p. 18.

production process grants them a position of power to be used in strikes[29]. And with having the earlier traditions of machine breaking and the like more concretely in mind, Klaus Tenfelde and Heinrich Volkmann agree: »The strike becomes dominant when the irreversibility of industrialisation is obvious and the social order reorganises itself«[30]. And in the long run even strikes will become more and more superfluous because in this perspective the permanent representation of working class interests through trade unions serves as a substitute for strikes.

Rather than following these older interpretations of working class protest coined by modernisation theory, a closer look seems useful. Comparing the two sea ports London and Hamburg in some more detail, a look at striking dockworkers suggests itself[31]. In London the West End riots of February 1886 when protesting unemployed pillaged the luxury boutiques there, and the so-called »Bloody Sunday« of November 1887 immediately preceded the dock labourers' strike in the summer of 1889, while the Hamburg dock workers' strike of 1896/97 was not foreshadowed in a similar way. Beyond those differences of context the strikers were in the same basic position. To be victorious, they had to succeed in two respects: Firstly, they had to impede the employers from recruiting blacklegs on a larger scale. This was particularly difficult for dock labourers who, being unskilled, could easily be replaced. Therefore, strikers repeatedly tried to intimidate strike-breakers by menacing them or by using physical violence. However, deterring blacklegs was only one condition for winning the strike. The second condition was to provide sufficient funds in order to guarantee the strike pay for an unforeseeable duration. As union membership had been low before the strikers downed their work, they depended on affluent sympathisers, i.e. they needed the goodwill at least of parts of the middle classes. And this meant that they had to refrain from physical violence as an instrument of power. This explains why, in the working class press and at the strikers' assemblies, labour leaders again and again urged their audience to prove their discipline and not to lapse into violence.

The ambivalence inherent in the conditions for settling the labour dispute with the desired outcome permeated both walkouts. While on the one hand the strike leaders recommended renouncing violence, on the other hand they permitted to read out the names of blacklegs, well aware that this was an invitation for applying sanctions that could easily end in violence. Still, the need for middle class allies or more vaguely some support from the public was crucially important for successful boycotts. And this is clearly a fundamental difference to the food riots discussed earlier where rioters claimed to represent the community against both greedy individuals and the authorities negligent of their obligations. The equally vertical structure linking workers and their employers does not comprise the whole of urban society and therefore gives weight to other parties. Now, it fits both common expectations and British self-perceptions that liberal voices were to be heard far more often in London. During the London dock strike, for instance, ›Lloyd's Weekly Newspaper‹

29   Cf. ibid., p. 23.
30   TENFELDE, VOLKMANN, Geschichte (1981), p. 20.
31   The rest of this section closely follows KRÜGER, LENGER, »Question« (forthcoming), where both the primary sources and the literature are given.

praised the strikers, who had *with manly dignity asserted the rights of labour to fair remu-neration.* Liberal London newspapers also laid great emphasis on human rights or, as they put it, the *right to live.* ›Reynold's Newspaper‹ believed: *The question between capital and labour for the future is to be stated in this way: How much payment suffices for decent liveli-hood.* And in overt opposition to the entrepreneurs' interpretation of the strike, the same paper argued: *The great strike is not a conspiracy of idealists, but a combination of earnest men in defence of the simple right to live in a condition that may make life tolerable.*

Social reformers as those organised around Toynbee Hall had counterparts in Ham-burg, but their conviction *that the aim should be to mitigate and reconcile the clashing in-terests, instead of aggravating them*, clearly was a minority position here. Rather sympa-thetic commentators like the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, who recommended studying the living conditions of the urban working classes on an impartial scientific basis in order to avoid an exacerbation of social conflict, were ostracised. In January 1897, he and some other professors and clergymen tried to help the strikers with an appeal for donations. Their aim was, *for the sake of the idea*, to create the conditions that would enable *the one side as well as the other to lead the negotiations without the pressure of imminent misery.* Tönnies paid for that by having to wait for decades before finding a permanent position in Kiel, a kind of exclusion openly advocated by the conservative local press.

In London, on the contrary, Samuel Barnett, the founder and Warden of Toynbee Hall, invited the strike leaders *to celebrate the victory* with a *supper party* without falling into dis-repute with his fellow middle class men. It is obvious that the indicated differences in public opinion were consequential for the acting of the authorities and ultimately for the success or failure of the strike. In Hamburg the police, for example, arrested the British trade union-ist Tom Mann, who visited Hamburg to promote the *International Federation of Ship, Dock and Riverside Workers*. When they examined his belongings, they found a letter warning

> *that it would be a serious blow to the Int. Fed. if the Hamburg Dockers were defeat-ed […]. Whereas if the men* [could] *be induced to return to work, even on a small concession, it would be a victory and* [would] *lessen the danger of involving the Int. Fed. in the gulf.*

Although Senator Georg Hachmann, the head of the police, admitted to the Hamburg Mayor in a letter that he did not know whether there was a legal footing for an inspection of Mann's correspondence, the police confidentially sent a copy of this letter to the dock directors' association. In consequence, the dock directors hardened their intransigent po-sition and decided to outfight the strikers at all costs. In London leading officials instead stressed time and again that the police had to act *in accordance with, and within the limits of law* and to maintain *an attitude of the strictest impartiality.*

Comparing the two events, one could – risking some oversimplification – interpret late nineteenth-century London as a model of liberal governmentality as described by Foucault in his famous lectures referred to above. While »discipline by definition orders every-thing«, its liberalist counterpart leaves alone[32]. This does not imply a strict policy of non-

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32   FOUCAULT, Geschichte, pt. 1 (2004), p. 74.

intervention but it presupposes that economy and society are quasi-natural entities regulating themselves: »The population as the mass of subjects is superseded by the population as the whole of natural phenomena«[33]. With regard to strikes rather than the regulation of urban grain supplies discussed by Foucault, John R. McCulloch comes to mind, who defended trade unions and strikes arguing that employers would never increase wages voluntarily. Therefore, collective pressure would be the only way to find out whether wage demands would be fair and reasonable – seemingly just another expression for being in accordance with supply and demand in the labour market[34]. This would suggest that at the time of the described events principles of a liberal governmentality had been firmly established and deeply entrenched, only in the English case a statement different from and completely independent of any judgement about the relative strength of liberal and conservative forces in the political arena. This makes it easier to understand why social reformers like Samuel Barnett were not ostracised by other middle class Londoners, who personally might have been less favourably disposed towards the strikers. It also explains why the statistical material collected with the massive financial support of Charles Booth carried much more weight in the English debate than the ideas of social reformers like Tönnies and Herkner, who were easily sidelined in Hamburg. After all, statistical information alone promised some insight into the self-regulating mechanisms assumed by a liberal governmentality.

Concluding remarks

Thus far, the interpretation of two concrete late-nineteenth-century strikes is largely compatible with the interpretative frame offered by Dick Geary or Klaus Tenfelde and Heinrich Volkmann: The aims of the strikers in Hamburg and London may have been quite similar, and the quite substantial differences in the course of those two events may be considered circumstantial. But as in the case of food riots and mass demonstrations, the limits of any interpretation informed by modernisation theory (Foucault`s included) become obvious when we broaden the picture a little bit. A look at two other European port cities may suffice. Now, striking workers in Barcelona or Belfast may have been as fond of a warm meal as Dick Geary has suggested. Their aims, however, went far beyond that and cannot be reduced to the consequences of differing circumstances. In the case of Barcelona this meant that – quite in line with the strength of the anarcho-syndicalist movement in that city – labour disputes were regarded as far more principled conflicts than mere fights over hours and pay. This had two implications: On the one hand, it entailed the possibility of small-scale escalation, i. e. the destruction of the shop or factory and violence against its owner instead of simply shutting down the production site (or harbour) by downing the work and denying access to those willing to work. Since many production sites remained within older neighbourhoods in Barcelona much longer than in other European

33   Ibid., p. 505.
34   Cf. BOHLENDER, Metamorphosen (2007), pp. 277–278.

cities, this situated labour conflicts in the living quarters of the workers themselves. On the other hand, strikes easily grew into general strikes or urban uprisings as happened in 1902 when a strike of metal workers led to the erection of barricades and bloody street fighting. In order to shut down the whole city, strikers and other protesters blocked the streetcar system, for example[35].

Neither the turn of a specific strike into the revolt of a neighbourhood nor the convergence of huge strikes and urban uprisings were unique to Barcelona. The former was typical of mono-industrial regions like the Ruhr where miners' strikes typically brought forward the solidarity of the community at large while the concomitance of large strikes and urban revolt in turn-of-the-century Barcelona only foreshadowed the events in Vienna in the summer of 1927 most famously described by Elias Canetti[36]. – Streetcars were of crucial importance in Belfast`s labour disputes, too. But they were so in a completely different manner. There one of the recurring strike aims of Protestant workers was to have their Catholic colleagues expelled from their jobs at the local shipyards. Therefore, on a smaller scale, attacks on Catholic workers using the trams that brought them from their highly segregated neighbourhoods to work, was part of the same strategy. These were excessively violent deeds going hand in hand with arson to enforce or move the fine lines separating Protestant and Catholic living quarters[37]. They thus resembled the protest forms so common in the multi-ethnic cities of Eastern Europe where pogroms were not the exclusive privilege of Tsarist cities[38]. Explanations of social protest informed by modernisation theory have never come to terms with these extremely violent urban conflicts that in most cases were only aggravated by World War I.

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35   Cf. LENGER, Metropolen (2013), p. 264; BÄCKER-WILKE, GRAFL, LENGER, Gewaltgemeinschaften (2013); LENGER, SCHELLENBERGER, Gewaltgemeinschaften (2017).
36   Cf. the summary in: LENGER, Metropolen (2013), pp. 394–395.
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