ἦ and Theory of Mind in the *Iliad*

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This paper addresses a word for which the *LfgE* article provides little actual guidance, particle requiring such extended and independent treatment. The lexicon is valuable, however, for its bibliography.[1] This study honors the project in a different way, by looking at a single word that may help us understand how Homeric characters think, the particle ἦ.

The aspect of Homeric psychology with which this paper will mainly concern itself is Theory of Mind (abbreviated ToM): the understanding of the self and others as beings who have beliefs, emotions, desires, the understanding that the mental states of others are often different from one's own at a particular moment, and the capacity to interact with others by making inferences about those mental states. Since a celebrated article in 1978 asked whether chimpanzees possess ToM, questions surrounding ToM have been important in developmental psychology, cognitive science, philosophy, and primatology.[2] Within the field there is ongoing debate about the nature of ToM, the two main branches being Theory Theory and Simulation Theory (Theory Theory holds that we use folk psychology to infer the mental states of others, Simulation Theory that we imagine what our mental states would be in another's situation).[3] However, experiment has brought consensus about some issues. Although there are both individual and cross-cultural differences in the development of ToM, these represent variation within a human universal: for example, everywhere, at roughly four years old, children acquire the ability to recognize that others may have false beliefs.

Homeric psychology has long been a significant question in Homeric studies, especially since Snell's famous argument that Homeric characters do not possess what moderns would call "minds."[4] Scholars have pursued this debate through two main issues. First, they have discussed how we should understand the decisions of characters and their responsibility for them, given how frequently the gods directly intervene in the characters' mental processes or are

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1   *LfgE* 12 (1987), (R. von Bennekom).
2   Permack and Woodruff 1978.
3   Doherty 2009 is a recent introduction; Carruthers/Smith 1996 includes essays from a wide range of fields.
4   Snell 1975, influenced by Voigt 1934.

said to do so.[5] The psychological literature on behavior attribution, how people explain their own and others' behavior, might be useful for this discussion, especially since attribution appears to be subject to significant cultural variation.[6] However, this paper will not discuss the specific attributions made by Homeric characters. Classicists have also discussed the language of the various mental organs in the Homeric epics and the extent to which they are distinct.[7] While contemporary classical scholarship rejects the Snell-Voigt view of the Homeric mind, there is no consensus about whether Homer's separate organs anticipate Plato's divisions of the soul or not.[8] Outside the field, the Snell–Voigt model continues to be influential.[9]

ToM has also been one of the concerns of a new subfield in the study of literature, cognitive poetics or cognitive literary studies.[10] While Homer does not provide the complex levels of ToM found in modern fiction, a consideration of ToM provides a way to look at Homeric psychology from a new perspective. Instead of asking how the poet depicts mental activity, it invites us to ask how the characters within the epic consider the mental activity of other characters. The Homeric poems are not subtle explorations of how one character's complex interiority imagines another's, but they are very rich in representations of people as they draw inferences, right or wrong, about the mental activity of others.

Of course, there are many representations in Homer of ToM where ἦ does not appear, while not all uses of the particle can be connected with ToM. In two famous examples, ἔγνω and νόει are used where a character—Achilles at *Il.* 1.333 and Alcinous at *Od*.6.67—recognizes and responds to the unspoken thoughts or feeling of an interlocutor whose speech has been inhibited by *aidos*. Achilles reads the external behavior of the heralds.[11] Alcinous knows his daughter and realizes that she is thinking about her marriage. He has perhaps been thinking about it himself—but the poet does not tell the audience this.

Although the particle offers only a very partial approach to Homeric ToM, it is a potentially useful one, and a consideration of how characters think about others' thoughts may help clarify some uses of the particle. For this paper, examples will be drawn from the *Iliad*, except where I am looking at word combinations for which it is necessary to collect all possible examples. ἦ's uses are

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5   Critiques of the Snell/Voigt model include Harrison 1960, Gaskin 1990, and especially Schmitt 1990.

6   Lillard 2006 summarizes studies of cultural difference.

7   Sullivan 1988; Jahn 1987 argues that the formulaic system is the main determinant of which terms are used. Clarke 1999, especially 53–69, is helpful.

8   So the analysis of Pelliccia 1995 is very different from that of Williams 1993.

9   For example, Taylor 1989, 118 (a very important book in moral philosophy).

10 *The New York Times* of March 30, 2010 had an article on the subject, with the headline "The Next Big Thing in English: Knowing They Know That You Know." See especially Zunshine 2006 and Leverage et al. 2011.

11 Kirk 1985–1993 on *Il.* 1.334–5.

customarily divided into affirmative and interrogative, though these are not entirely straightforward categories, and the interrogative is a specialized use of the affirmative. It is straightforward that ἦ is a word of character-speech. There are only a handful of examples of uncombined ἦ from the *Iliad*'s narrator.[12]

Ruijgh proposed that ἦ works in opposition to οὐ.[13] It affirms what a listener might be inclined to doubt or deny. Wakker (examining tragedy, however, not Homer) sets ἦ in contrast to μήν: μήν affirms the sincerity of the speaker, while ἦ insists on the external truth of the speaker's claims.[14] If ἦ tends to be used where the listener might be inclined to doubt, it indicates that the speaker senses the likelihood of doubt. The particle therefore has a basic connection with ToM. Yet a speaker can use affirmative ἦ when speaking to himself—the doubt can be his own.

ἦ often appears in questions or statements that involve ToM claims, and is also found with inferences, evaluations, statements about the future, and promises. It is only rarely used when knowable facts, such as past events, as at issue. (Many of its uses with an aorist or imperfect are judgments like ἦ τ᾽ ἂν πολὺ κέρδιον ἦεν, *Il.* 5.201, 23.103, and *Od.* 9.228) or ἦ τέ τοι ἄγχι / ἦλθε κακόν, 11.362, 20.449, where a speaker interprets events.) Rather it points to the external realities that justify the speaker's perception or judgment; hence it often appears with μάλα, μέγα, or πολύ. The reality itself is not open to doubt, but the speaker's evaluation of it is. The particle only rarely affirms the truth of what could actually be known, but insists on the rightness of inferences, predictions, and evaluations. When Zeus says, ὢ πόποι, ἦ φίλον ἄνδρα διωκόμενον περὶ τεῖχος / ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὁρῶμαι (*Il.* 22.168–9), he goes on to say that Hector offered many sacrifices.[15] Zeus does not emphasize the truth of what he says because he worries that anyone will doubt that he cares about Hector, but he asserts that his feeling is based on good reasons. Hector is not only dear to Zeus, but deserves to be. Similarly, the combination ἦ τε is used mainly apodotically or in sentences that, in Ruijgh's formulation, "exprime un fait plus ou moins hypothétique."[16]

Homeric speakers use the combination ἦ ἵνα to follow a question about another's motives by proposing an answer. These proposed answers (which are normally punctuated and understood as rhetorical questions) make mind-reading claims. The epic corpus presents five examples of ἦ ἵνα. All belong to a recognized category for interrogative ἦ—the pattern in which a speaker asks

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12 This is not true of all its combinations, such as ἦ τοι, which indicates that they are appropriately treated separately. Frazer 1981 examines ἦ τοι in self-corrections. This paper will not consider ἦ τοι.

13 Ruijgh 194–5 (paragraph 187).

14 Wakker 1997.

15 Richardson in Kirk 1985–1993 ad loc (p. 126) points out that φίλον ἄνδρα is a unique expression with strong emotional weight.

16 Ruijgh 1971, 798, (paragraph 655).

about someone's motives, and then proposes an answer to the question.[17] All are sarcastic, but the sarcasm is of different kinds.[18] When Odysseus asks Athena why she sent Telemachus to look for his father instead of telling him the truth, he asks:

> ἦ ἵνα που καὶ κεῖνος ἀλώμενος ἄλγεα πάσχῃ
> πόντον ἐπ᾽ ἀτρύγετον, βίοτον δέ οἱ ἄλλοι ἔδωσι;
>
> (*Od*. 13.418)

Odysseus surely does not believe that Athena sent Telemachus abroad for these reasons—που further marks the proposal as an inference. Odysseus is covertly rebuking Athena, implying that a neutral observer would think she had sent Telemachus to travel in order to make him suffer and cause further damage to his property, and that her real motive was inadequate. He has already pointed out that she did not help him during the Adventures (*Od*. 13.316–19), and she has excused herself by saying that she did not want to fight with Poseidon (*Od*. 13.341–3). Odysseus may not be fully satisfied by her explanation. Similarly, Penelope at *Od*. 4.710 rebukes the absent Telemachus, ἦ ἵνα μηδ᾽ ὄνομ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐν ἀνθρώποισι λίπηται; Again, Penelope evidently thinks that Telemachus' actual motive cannot have been adequate. Here, Athena's motive for having him travel is exactly the opposite of Penelope's sarcastic guess. Zeus, remarkably, speaks similarly of his own motives for giving immortal horses to Peleus at *Il*. 17.445, ἦ ἵνα δυστήνοισι μετ᾽ ἀνδράσιν ἄλγε᾽ ἔχητον; Of course Zeus knows that he acted to honor Peleus, not to cause suffering to the horses, but he expresses his dismay at the consequences that he failed adequately to consider.[19] At *Il*. 1.203 when Achilles asks why Athena has come from Olympus— ἦ ἵνα ὕβριν ἴδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονος Ἀτρεΐδαο; Achilles surely realizes that Athena has not pulled his hair and spun him around because she has come to see Agamemnon's hybris. He, like Odysseus, uses the formula in (subtle) rebuke, but in this instance he implies that the motive he names ought to be her reason, although it is not.

Finally, Apollo asks Athena why she has come from Olympus to the Trojan battlefield:

> ἦ ἵνα δὴ Δαναοῖσι μάχης ἑτεραλκέα νίκην
> δῷς; ἐπεὶ οὔ τι Τρῶας ἀπολλυμένους ἐλεαίρεις.
>
> (*Il*. 7.26–7)

Athena has indeed come to help the Danaans, and Apollo is sincere in stating what he infers about her motives. However, he is, like the other speakers,

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17 Denniston 1954, 283.

18 *BK* on *Il*. 1. 203. says "nicht selten ironisch."

19 Griffin 1980, 190, points out that Zeus seems to be more distressed for the horses than for Patroclus.

criticizing the motive, as he makes clear—Athena should pity the Trojans, but does not.

A speaker who makes a rhetorical point by imputing a false motive to the interlocutor is very confident, since the speech would badly misfire if the real motive were accidentally named. There is real ToM behind the false allegations. Still, Odysseus' and Achilles' implied rebukes of Athena, and Penelope's of Telemachus, are not just unfair, but say more about the speakers than about those who motives appear to be in question. Penelope is resisting Telemachus' new maturity, while Achilles does not want Athena to interfere with his decision whether to kill Agamemnon. Odysseus may or may not know Athena's real motives, but he attributes the desire to make Telemachus suffer to Athena not only as a complaint about this action, but because he resents her failure to help him during his wanderings—that is surely the implication of καὶ κεῖνος. Odysseus has just overtly complained about her earlier absence. She has excused herself, explaining that she did not want to fight with Poseidon (*Od.* 13.314–28, 338–43). Odysseus, evidently, is still (not surprisingly) resentful. In all these instances, the characters protest from a limited and local viewpoint. Apollo is correct about Athena's desire to help the Danaans, but she could just as fairly have complained that he pities only the Trojans. Only a few lines later, he implies that Troy is doomed only because "you two goddesses" wish it to be (30–32), with no acknowledgment of the will of Zeus.

ἦ is also found in other examples that show the Homeric characters' ToM in action. Some, like the cases with ἵνα, ironically impute motives that the speaker knows are false. Achilles angrily asks Odysseus during the Embassy:

> τί δὲ λαὸν ἀνήγαγεν ἐνθάδ' ἀγείρας
> Ἀτρεΐδης; ἦ οὐχ Ἑλένης ἕνεκ' ἠϋκόμοιο;
> ἦ μοῦνοι φιλέουσ' ἀλόχους μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
> Ἀτρεΐδαι;
>
> (*Il*. 9.338–40)

The first ἦ introduces a straightforward and sincere alleged motive. The second is more complex. At least one other premise is assumed between the two questions: ["Why did he take away my wife?] However, since the point at issue is the inconsistency in Agamemnon's actions, Achilles must be aiming his second question too at Agamemnon's motives: he is not really asking whether only the Atreidae love their wives, but whether Agamemnon believes this to be true (and of course he knows that Agamemnon does not believe this).

Questions often precede such imputations of false motives. For instance, Agamemnon asks the Achaeans at *Il*. 4.242–6 why they are not fighting, and compares them to fawns. Then he complains:

> ἦ μένετε Τρῶας σχεδὸν ἐλθέμεν ἔνθά τε νῆες
> εἰρύατ' εὔπρυμνοι πολιῆς ἐπὶ θινὶ θαλάσσης,
> ὄφρα ἴδητ' αἴ κ' ὔμμιν ὑπέρσχῃ χεῖρα Κρονίων
>
> (*Il*. 4.247–9)

Similarly, Athena first asks Ares if he has not heard what Hera has just said (*Il.* 15.130–31) and then rebukes him at 15.132–3:

> ἦ ἐθέλεις αὐτὸς μὲν ἀναπλήσας κακὰ πολλὰ
> ἂψ ἴμεν Οὔλυμπον δὲ καὶ ἀχνύμενός περ ἀνάγκη

A question is not the only way to introduce this kind of speech, however. For example, Aias exhorts the Achaeans to valor, and then complains to them at *Il.* 15.504–5:

> ἦ ἔλπεσθ᾽ ἢν νῆας ἕλῃ κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ
> ἐμβαδὸν ἵξεσθαι ἢν πατρίδα γαῖαν ἕκαστος;

All these beliefs and intentions are absurd, but Homeric rebukes are not supposed to be "fair." Here the false and absurd suggestions about the interlocutors' intentions are not expressions of the speaker's beliefs about the others' thoughts. Instead, they express the speaker's own anxieties. Athena, for example, continues her rebuke of Ares:

> αὐτὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοισι κακὸν μέγα πᾶσι φυτεῦσαι;
> αὐτίκα γὰρ Τρῶας μὲν ὑπερθύμους καὶ Ἀχαιοὺς
> λείψει, ὃ δ᾽ ἡμέας εἶσι κυδοιμήσων ἐς Ὄλυμπον,
> μάρψει δ᾽ ἐξείης ὅς τ᾽ αἴτιος ὅς τε καὶ οὐκί.

Unmistakably, Athena is more concerned for herself than for Ares, putting into his mind as a possible desire (ἐθέλεις) the consequence she hopes to avoid. While Athena does not say anything explicitly about what Zeus will think or feel, she can predict how he will act if Ares intervenes. She may be relying simply on past experience, not claiming any insight into Zeus' mental life but inferring future behavior from a pattern that she perceives.

ἦ also, as we have seen at *Il.* 7.26–7, introduces sincere Theory-of-Mind claims. Agamemnon at *Il.* 1.131–2 accuses Achilles of trying to trick him with the proposal that Agamemnon wait for the capture of Troy to obtain a replacement prize, but that he will then receive three or four times as much (*Il.* 1.122–9). He continues:

> ἦ ἐθέλεις ὄφρ᾽ αὐτὸς ἔχῃς γέρας, αὐτὰρ ἔμ᾽ αὔτως
> ἧσθαι δευόμενον, κέλεαι δέ με τήνδ᾽ ἀποδοῦναι;
> (*Il.* 1.133–4)

This is surely what Agamemnon believes Achilles wants, and he is, in a sense, right. The solution Achilles is proposing would leave Agamemnon with no prize, while Achilles still had his. Agamemnon's formulation, however, is highly emotional, marked by the contrast between Achilles and himself in αὐτάρ and the self-pity manifest in αὔτως ἧσθαι δευόμενον. The intention that Agamemnon attributes to Achilles is not just a particular policy, but a wish to humiliate Agamemnon. Because he would find the outcome of this proposal humiliating, he assumes that it was Achilles' intention that he should be humil-

iated. There is no reason to think that Achilles actually intends his suggestion this way, or that he anticipated Agamemnon's response; Achilles presumably assumes that the promise of multiple recompense later is a sufficient counterweight to immediate loss. Agamemnon fails to read Achilles' mind adequately, but his failure also hints that Achilles has failed to read Agamemnon's mind adequately.

Sometimes, this emotional component in Theory-of-Mind passages fully dominates. At 18.287, when Hector addresses Polydamas: ἦ οὔ πω κεκόρησθε ἐελμένοι ἔνδοθι πύργων; he does not have a reasoned judgment that Polydamas finds the siege less frustrating than others, nor is he falsely suggesting that he thinks this. In his anger that Polydamas disagrees with his plans, he finds it impossible to imagine that anyone who shares his experience of the siege can be opposed to his attempt to end it. Here, again, no question precedes 287, but instead we have the statement that Hector is unhappy with Polydamas' advice (*Il.* 18.285–6. The most extreme example of such pseudo-Theory-of-mind is Priam's hysterical treatment of the Trojans who come to comfort him:

> ἦ ὀνόσασθ’[20] ὅτι μοι Κρονίδης Ζεὺς ἄλγε’ ἔδωκε
> παῖδ’ ὀλέσαι τὸν ἄριστον; ἀτὰρ γνώσεσθε καὶ ὔμμες
> ῥηΐτεροι γὰρ μᾶλλον Ἀχαιοῖσιν δὴ ἔσεσθε
> κείνου τεθνηῶτος ἐναιρέμεν. αὐτὰρ ἔγωγε
> πρὶν ἀλαπαζομένην τε πόλιν κεραϊζομένην τε
> ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδεῖν βαίην δόμον Ἄϊδος εἴσω.
> Ἦ, καὶ σκηπανίῳ δίεπ’ ἀνέρας
>
> (*Il.* 24.241–7)

Priam, of course, knows that the Trojans know all this as well as he does. He is simply using criticism of the Trojans as a focus for his undirected anger and fear.

Even when a guess at another's intentions is almost accurate, it is colored by the speaker's own attitudes. Hecuba uses the ἦ of suggested response when she sees Hector in the city:

> τέκνον, τίπτε λιπὼν πόλεμον θρασὺν εἰλήλουθας;
> ἦ μάλα δὴ τείρουσι δυσώνυμοι υἷες Ἀχαιῶν
> μαρνάμενοι περὶ ἄστυ· σὲ δ’ ἐνθάδε θυμὸς ἀνῆκεν
> ἐλθόντ’ ἐξ ἄκρης πόλιος Διὶ χεῖρας ἀνασχεῖν.
>
> (*Il.* 6.254–7)

This is not punctuated as a question, but it is not really distinguishable from the suggested responses that editors treat as questions. Hecuba clearly believes that she understands why Hector has left battle, since she offers her son wine as

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20 This is the reading of Aristarchus; the paradosis is οὔνεσθ’. West daggers (see West 2001, 278); *BK* ad loc. follows the analogy with *Od.* 17. 378–9, which is similarly sarcastic.

a restorative (ἀνδρὶ δὲ κεκμηῶτι μένος μέγα οἶνος ἀέξει, 261). Hector does not
actually seem to feel especially tired (and he disagrees with her about the ef-
fects of wine, 264–5). The listener knows that Hecuba has generally the right
idea, but is wrong in detail, Hector's own *thymos* has not inspired his visit to
Troy, but rather advice from Helenus. He does not intend to go himself to the
acropolis to pray, but to send the women. The prayer is not to be directed to
Zeus, but to Athena. We may guess that Hecuba assumes that Hector is tired
because she is his mother. As in other examples, the speaker's own situation
influences how that person considers the mental lives of others. Her other
errors of detail are even more subtle reflections of how one person's under-
standing of both other individuals and of the broader situation affect the opera-
tions of theory-of-mind. Hecuba knows Hector well enough to realize that a
need for prayer is the likeliest cause of his departure from the battlefield, since
he is too responsible a leader to come to the city for any less important a con-
cern. She has no way, however, of knowing about Helenus' advice to Hector.
Because she has such respect for her son, she automatically assumes that his
decision to come into Troy was spontaneously and entirely his own, and she
automatically assumes that he will want to pray to the greatest of the gods.

We can see the same technique in passages where editors place affirmative
rather than interrogative ἦ at the introduction of a a theory-of-mind assertion.
For example, Hector's famous false assumption about Patroclus:

> Πάτροκλ᾽, ἦ που ἔφησθα πόλιν κεραϊξέμεν ἁμήν
> Τρωϊάδας δὲ γυναῖκας ἐλεύθερον ἦμαρ ἀπούρας
> ἄξειν ἐν νήεσσι φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν,
> νήπιε
>
> (*Il.* 16.830–33)

Striking here, as in the earlier examples, is how Hector describes what Patroc-
lus expected in terms that are obviously those of his own imagination. Hector
says that Patroclus imagined enslaving the Trojan women because that is his
own worst fear; Patroclus himself might have amplified the basic idea "take
Troy" very differently.

If, in *Iliad* 1, Agamemnon distorts what Achilles desires, Achilles is not
conscientious in his reconstruction of Agamemnon's thinking, either. He says
that Agamemnon has "the heart of a deer"—that is, that he is cowardly—and
claims that Agamemnon avoids going into battle or joining ambushes with the
other Achaean leaders (*Il.* 1.225–8). He then adds a motive for Agamemnon's
avoidance of danger:

> ἦ πολὺ λώϊόν ἐστι κατὰ στρατὸν εὐρὺν Ἀχαιῶν
> δῶρ᾽ ἀποαιρεῖσθαι ὅς τις σέθεν ἀντίον εἴπῃ
>
> (*Il.* 1.229–30)

Affirmative ἦ is often found with adjectives or adverbs, like πολυ here. But
there can be little doubt that Achilles is not making a general statement about

the best course of action for anyone, but asserting that he understands how Agamemnon thinks. He connects Agamemnon's alleged cowardice with his alleged greed and his behavior now, implying a coherent strategy that Agamemnon follows. While others increase their booty by themselves fighting to win it, Agamemnon has realized that he can more easily obtain goods by taking them away from anyone who opposes him. Since such a strategy would be imaginable only for Agamemnon, Achilles is engaging in ToM. He probably is not seriously proposing that Agamemnon has such a strategy, however. The rest of the poem will prove that the accusation of cowardice is, at best, exaggerated. Instead, he wants to emphasize that Agamemnon's threat to take his prize belongs in such a strategy. Whether or not Agamemnon actually thinks this way, he is acting as if he did. Affirmative ἦ does not indicate genuine belief in the truth of what is asserted, but directs the audiences (internal and external), to the speaker's irony.

When Helen again pretends to imagine Aphrodite's intentions, the situation is slightly different, but again the function of ToM, even when it is accurate, is to reveal the speaker's concerns. Aphrodite, in disguise, has urged Helen to go to Paris, so Helen knows exactly what her immediate intentions are. Helen uses the ἦ of a proposed motive:

> δαιμονίη, τί με ταῦτα λιλαίεαι ἠπεροπεύειν;
> ἦ πή με προτέρω πολίων εὖ ναιομενάων
> ἄξεις, ἢ Φρυγίης ἢ Μῃονίης ἐρατεινῆς,
> εἴ τίς τοι καὶ κεῖθι φίλος μερόπων ἀνθρώπων
> <div align="right">(Il. 3.400–402)</div>

Indeed, she continues by proposing a true answer to her question:

> οὕνεκα δὴ *νῦν* δῖον Ἀλέξανδρον Μενέλαος
> νικήσας ἐθέλει στυγερὴν ἐμὲ οἴκαδ' ἄγεσθαι,
> τοὔνεκα δὴ *νῦν* δεῦρο δολοφρονέουσα παρέστης;
> <div align="right">(Il. 3.403–5)</div>

The falsely imputed intention expresses Helen's broader frustration at being a tool for Aphrodite.

When Hector rebukes Paris for retreating before Menelaus, he reconstructs the likely Achaean reaction:

> ἦ που καγχαλόωσι κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοὶ
> φάντες ἀριστῆα πρόμον ἔμμεναι, οὕνεκα καλὸν
> εἶδος ἔπ', ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι βίη φρεσὶν οὐδέ τις ἀλκή.
> <div align="right">(Il. 3.43–5)</div>

The audience has no way of knowing whether the Achaeans have indeed been brought to laugh out loud at the absurdity of selecting a leader for his good looks. The bad behavior of Paris is probably more salient to Hector than it is to the Achaeans, but Hector is not really talking about what the Achaeans

actually think, but what he would think if he were in their position, and what Paris is giving them the opportunity to think.

This pseudo-theory-of-mind can be somewhat more complex. Nestor, speaking to Patroclus, issues a rebuke to Achilles that sounds very much like the just-cited examples from the battlefield, but in the third person:

> ἦ μένει εἰς ὅ κε δὴ *νῆες* θοαὶ ἄγχι θαλάσσης
> Ἀργείων ἀέκητι πυρὸς δηΐοιο θέρωνται,
> αὐτοί τε κτεινώμεθ᾽ ἐπισχερώ;
>
> (*Il*. 11.666–8)

Nestor surely intends this complaint in the same spirit as Agamemnon and Aias mean theirs. From his point of view, this is a reductio ad absurdum of Achilles' behavior. Achilles, however, has announced to the Embassy that this is precisely what he intends, since he will fight only when Hector reaches his own ships (*Il*. 9.650–53). Nestor, however, does not know that Achilles said this, since Odysseus reported only his first speech. Achilles himself refers back to his earlier statement at 16.61–3. So Nestor thinks he is falsely attributing an intention to Achilles when he is describing his intentions fairly accurately. After his narrative, he will propose the exchange of armor to Patroclus in the case that Achilles wants to help the Achaeans but is prevented by a prophecy (11.794–803). The condition does not apply, but Achilles will apply the suggestion for his own purposes. Nestor seems to find Achilles incomprehensible.

Sometimes it is hard to judge's a character's speculations about another character's thoughts. Achilles addresses Aeneas on the battlefield, using the ἦ of a suggested reply:

> Αἰνεία, τί σὺ τόσσον ὁμίλου πολλὸν ἐπελθὼν
> ἔστης; ἦ σέ γε θυμὸς ἐμοὶ μαχέσασθαι ἀνώγει
> ἐλπόμενον Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξειν ἱπποδάμοισι
> τιμῆς τῆς Πριάμου
>
> (*Il*. 20.178–81)

Since Achilles continues by arguing that such an expectation would be utterly unrealistic, he seems actually to believe that Aeneas could have such a hope. He continues with the alternate possibility that Aeneas is motivated by the hope of an exceptionally fine *temenos* if he kills Achilles; he responds to this possibility by arguing that Aeneas will not find it easy to kill Achilles. Achilles seems to realize that he simply does not understand why Aeneas would fight him. He has, of course, no idea that Apollo in disguise has prompted Aeneas (and that Aeneas expressed his reluctance before being persuaded, *Il*. 20.79–111). At the end of the episode, Achilles uses a doubled ἦ to express his perplexity at Aeneas' rescue: Aeneas' disappearance is truly a great wonder (20.344) and, contrary to Achilles' assumptions, Aeneas turns to be truly dear to the gods (20.347–8 of). There are limits on Achiles' understanding of other people and of the world.

Both affirmative and interrogative ἦ, then, appear regularly in theory-of-mind passages — but these passages suggest that *Iliadic* characters are either not very interested in accurately commenting on the mental lives or others, or they are more concerned with their own purposes—probably the latter. However, sometimes speakers use expressions with ἦ to offer support for their theory-of-mind inferences. Nestor, for example, uses the particle twice when he considers the consequences of the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon:

> ὢ πόποι ἦ μέγα πένθος Ἀχαιΐδα γαῖαν ἱκάνει
> ἦ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος Πριάμοιό τε παῖδες…
>
> (*Il*.1.254–55)

Nestor can have no direct knowledge of how the news of the quarrel will be received at home, and indeed he speaks as if the information were being transmitted instantaneously. In contrast, he uses the optative to distance the Trojans from this knowledge (εἰ…πυθοιατο, 1.257), even as he stresses how precisely he can predict their response. However, this inference about the Trojans justifies the claim that grief is coming to Achaea. Then, by pointing out that Agamemnon and Achilles are pre-eminent in both fighting and counsel (258), he explains why he is so certain that the news of the quarrel would please the Trojan rulers, and this explanation then further justifies his claim that *great* grief is coming to Achaea.

Nestor repeats this structure in his rebuke to the Achaeans for failing to respond to Hector's challenge:

> ὢ πόποι ἦ μέγα πένθος Ἀχαιΐδα γαῖαν ἱκάνει.
> ἦ κε μέγ᾽ οἰμώξειε γέρων ἱππηλάτα Πηλεὺς…
>
> (*Il.* 7.124–5)

The optative speculation about Peleus' response justifies the statement that great grief is reaching Achaea. He then explains that he has personal knowledge from which he can judge Peleus' likely reaction to the leaders' failure to answer Hector's challenge (7.126–8), having witnessed Peleus' delight in asking about the ancestry of the Argives participating in the Trojan expedition.

ἦ, even when the sentence it introduces does not make a theory-of-mind claim or conjecture, most often appear at this boundary where an individual, internal judgment meets the external world—or the judgments of others. Only occasionally does it insist on a fact. Affirmative ἦ frequently follows ὢ πόποι, as it does in the lines just cited, where it insists on the speaker's accuracy in insisting not just that grief is coming to Achaea, but that this grief is great. In another example of sequential ἦ, Aias addresses Hector:

> ἦ θήν πού τοι θυμὸς ἐέλπεται ἐξαλαπάξειν
> νῆας· ἄφαρ δέ τε χεῖρες ἀμύνειν εἰσὶ καὶ ἡμῖν.
> ἦ κε πολὺ φθαίη εὖ ναιομένη πόλις ὑμὴ
> χερσὶν ὑφ᾽ ἡμετέρῃσιν ἁλοῦσά τε περθομένη τε.
>
> (*Il.* 13. 813–6)

The first ἦ introduces a sincere and accurate theory-of-mind statement about Hector's beliefs, the second the speaker's evaluation of the likely outcome. Achilles greets the embassy with two ἦ-statements:

> χαίρετον· ἦ φίλοι ἄνδρες ἱκάνετον· ἦ τι μάλα χρεώ
> οἵ μοι σκυζομένῳ περ Ἀχαιῶν φίλτατοί ἐστον.
>   (*Il.* 9.197–8)

The first ἦ-statement reassures the visitors that Achilles recognizes their status as his friends. It indicates his understanding that they are uncertain of his attitude. The second marks his judgment of their action in coming to see him, and suggests that he shares the view that he believes they have themselves.

Interrogative ἦ is likewise closely associated with issues of mind, even outside the "suggested motive" use. It typically attempts to establish a shared understanding between speaker and interlocutor in a situation where the basis for such shared understanding already exists, but a shared interpretation needs to be established. When Athena urges Pandarus to shoot Menelaus and Helenus urges Hector to challenge the Achaeans, each begins ἦ ῥά νύ μοί τι πίθοιο; (4.93, 7.48). Each follows the initial request with a reason why the interlocutor should comply. The formula ἦ οὐ μέμνη (*Il.* 15.18, 20.188 21.396) implies that the interlocutor does and should remember a relevant episode in the past. Nestor says to Diomedes:

> Τυδεΐδη ,ἄγε δ᾽ αὖτε φόβον δ᾽ ἔχε μώνυχας ἵππους.
> ἦ οὐ γιγνώσκεις ὅ τοι ἐκ Διὸς οὐχ ἕπετ᾽ ἀλκή;
>   (*Il.* 8.139–40)

Nestor, of course, knows that Diomedes can recognize Zeus' hostility—thunderbolts have fallen directly in front of his chariot—but he needs to overcome Diomedes' resistance to retreating.

Epeius, boasting that he will win the boxing match, complains:

> ἦ οὐχ ἅλις ὅττι μάχης ἐπιδεύομαι; οὐδ᾽ ἄρα πως ἦν
> ἐν πάντεσσ᾽ ἔργοισι δαήμονα φῶτα γενέσθαι
>   (*Il.* 23.670–71)

He appeals to common knowledge that he is not a warrior of the first rank. He knows that they all know. His implied argument seems to be:

Major premise: Nobody is good at everything (but, by implication, everyone is good at something)

Minor premise: I am not good in battle, as everyone knows

Conclusion: I am good at something else (namely, boxing). ἦ marks this essential shared knowledge.

In other passages, the particle demands an interlocutor's agreement to an unhappy speaker's resentful interpretation of events. Agamemnon complains to Zeus:

Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἦ ῥά τιν᾽ ἤδη ὑπερμενέων βασιλήων
τῇδ᾽ ἄτῃ ἄασας καί μιν μέγα κῦδος ἀπηύρας;

(*Il.* 8.236–7)

This is closely comparable to Thetis' complaint to Hephaestus:

Ἥφαιστ᾽, ἦ ἄρα δή τις, ὅσαι θεαί εἰσ᾽ ἐν Ὀλύμπῳ,
τοσσάδ᾽ ἐνὶ φρεσὶν ᾗσιν ἀνέσχετο κήδεα λυγρὰ
ὅσσ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἐκ πασέων Κρονίδης Ζεὺς ἄλγε᾽ ἔδωκεν;

(*Il.*18.429–31)

Agamemnon goes on to remind Zeus of his many sacrifices and to pray that he save the Achaeans, if not the ships; Thetis catalogues her miseries. These are not real questions, of course, but complaints and requests for sympathy. This interrogative ἦ is very close to the affirmative, since the speaker seeks agreement not about what has taken place, but about his interpretation of it as worse than what has happened in any comparable case. These questions could not be called theory-of-mind claims, but they indicate that the speaker expects a certain receptivity from the interlocutor, a receptivity that ἦ seems to demand.

Addendum:

Finally, there are the cases in which the narrator uses the particle: 13.354, 16.362 and 16.46, as well as the two where he uses ἦ τε. In two of the examples, the particle appears to have been borrowed from the character, and the phenomenon is close to free indirect discourse. At 16.362–3, Hector realizes that battle has turned in favor of the Achaeans, but fights in order to let the other Trojans retreat:

ἦ μὲν δὴ γίγνωσκε μάχης ἑτεραλκέα νίκην·
ἀλλὰ καὶ ὣς ἀνέμιμνε, σάω δ᾽ ἐρίηρας ἑταίρους.

The lines are about his mental state, and σάω is surely conative. At 13. 353–6, Poseidon intervenes against Zeus' will:

… Διὶ δὲ κρατερῶς ἐνεμέσσα.
ἦ μὰν ἀμφοτέροισιν ὁμὸν γένος ἠδ᾽ ἴα πάτρη,
ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πρότερος γεγόνει καὶ πλείονα ᾔδη.
τώ ῥα καὶ ἀμφαδίην μὲν ἀλεξέμεναι ἀλέεινε…

These lines anticipate 15.185–204, when Poseidon complains that Zeus is arrogating too much power (in effect expanding 13.354), while Iris reminds him that Zeus is older (echoing 13.356). The ἦ-statement follows a description of Poseidon's emotional state and is followed by a line from which it is explicit that this view of Zeus explains why Poseidon acts as he does. Yet would Po-

seidon express his awareness of Zeus' greater power as an admission that Zeus "knows more" than he? In both these passages, there is evidently some contamination between the narrator's voice and the character's thoughts—it is FID, although the language is the narrator's.[21] I would not call it character-focalization, but ἦ is as much Hector's and Poseidon's word as the narrator's.

The other examples, however, indicate a very different situation in which the narrator uses the particle of character-speech.

> Ὣς φάτο λισσόμενος μέγα νήπιος·ἦ γὰρ ἔμελλεν
> οἷ αὐτῷ θάνατόν τε κακὸν καὶ κῆρα λιτέσθαι.
> (*Il.* 16.46–7).

Here the narrator is commenting precisely on what the character does not know but the narrator does; if, as I am arguing, ἦ affirms the truth of speech mainly when genuine proof is not possible, this would seem to be an extraordinary exception.

This is the only Iliadic example of the particle with a form of μέλλω. The Odyssey has parallels, however. Although it uses ἦ τοι, *Od.* 22.98 may help explain the usage at *Il.* 16.46[22]. The narrator first informs the audience that Antinous expected to be able to succeed in the bow-contest (*Od.* 22.96–97), and then explains how wrong he was:

> ἦ τοι ὀϊστοῦ γε πρῶτος γεύσασθαι ἔμελλεν
> ἐκ χειρῶν Ὀδυσῆος ἀμύμονος, ὃν τότ᾽ ἀτίμα
> ἥμενος ἐν μεγάροισ᾽, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ὤρνυε πάντας ἑταίρους.
> (*Od.* 22.98–100)

As in the comment on Patroclus, the narrator here notes the character's inability to foresee the consequences of his action. The narrator of the *Odyssey* does not use the word νήπιος here, because Antinous has just introduced it into the hearer's mind by saying that as a small child, he saw Odysseus, πάϊς δ᾽ ἔτι νήπιος ἦα (*Od.* 22.95). The irony is obvious, and the narrator does not need to repeat the word in his own voice.

Two of the narrator's uses of ἦ with ἔμελλεν, then, explain why the character is a νήπιος. Even though the sentence in which the particle is used appears to be a statement about past facts, it serves to defend the narrator's evaluation of the character. The Homeric narrator never calls a character νήπιος without an explanation of why the judgment is justified, which suggests that these evaluations do not belong to the objective knowledge bestowed by the Muses.[23]

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21   For the problems of FID, see Fludernik 1993, 398–414.
22   In four of the five, the form of μέλλω stands at verse-end, as it does in the formula οὐδ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἔμελλεν (3x in *Il.*, 2x in *Od.*; the *Il.* examples are narrator-speech, in the *Od.* Odysseus comments with hindsight). See de Jong 2001, 251.
23   Fränkel 1976, 41 note 31, claims that this is objective knowledge.

They express the narrator's pity for mortal ignorance.[24] Even an ἔμελλεν-statement of this kind is not necessarily spoken with the poet's special authority. As a prolepsis, it depends on the poet's knowledge of the plot. However, these passages stress a character's ignorance, implying that the outcome was already a real possibility, not beyond the power of the character to foresee, had the character not been, as mortals characteristically are, unaware of the wider context of his choices.

We can compare the instances with ἦ τε in the narrator's voice: *Il.* 16.687 and 17.236. 16.687 again concerns Patroclus. He was a νήπιος (16.686), for he had done as Achilles told him, ἦ τ' ἂν ὑπέκφυγε κῆρα κακὴν μέλανος θανάτοιο. In *Il.* 17.236, the narrator is commenting on the folly of the Trojans, who fully expected to be able to take the corpse of Patroclus from Aias, νήπιοι; instead he killed many of them. Although this line provides one of the relatively rare instances of the particle to mark an indubitable past fact, the line is still close to a condition—if the Trojans had been wise, these men would not have died.

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24 Griffin 1986, 40; de Jong 1987, 86–7. Griffin thinks that the narrator can use the word in this unusually evaluative way because it can also be used to mean "small child."

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